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Introduction
Senegal has been experiencing an ongoing low-intensity conflict between the Senegalese
government and the Movement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (Movement of
Democratic Forces of Casamance –MFDC) since 1982. Figure 1 illustrates how Senegal is
essentially divided in two by Gambia. Casamance is the southern region of Senegal,
Figure 1

which leaves it isolated from the North, and the capital Dakar. This separation has produced
long-term tensions based on the marginalization of the Casamance people. The geographic
location of Casamance along with other socio-economic factors led to a separatist movement by
the MFDC. The conflict is classified as low-intensity, meaning that there is a political-military
confrontation between groups below conventional levels of war but above routine, peaceful
procedures.1 However, a 2017 conflict vulnerability assessment notes that since the conflict has
begun it has lead to thousands of deaths, over 78 villages destroyed, over 150,000 people have
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lost their homes, and there are approximately 6,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs).2
Additionally, in 2018, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), there were approximately 18,000 Casamance refugees in the Gambia and GuineaBissau.3 Overall, more than 60,000 have fled the area due to the conflict.4 The conflict in
Casamance has been a primary factor in causing regional displacement, specifically, in Gambia
and the Casamance region. The UNHCR is responsible for helping to solve the plight of
refugees. The three traditional solutions for solving refugeehood are third country resettlement,
local integration, and voluntary repatriation. Ultimately, states remain the primary actors in the
protection of refugees with the UNHCR acting at the mercy of states.5 However, not all states
treat refugees equally and this is evident through different refugee policies..
In relation to other states in the world, Gambia offers generous refugee policies. The
government has agreed to include the years spent as a refugee towards the total time required to
meet the criteria for naturalization. Gambia has also prolonged residence permits from one year
to five years for all refugees. In regards to the Casamance refugees specifically, the state agreed
to reduce the processing fees for residence permits by 80%. Both the Gambia and Senegal have
signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.
Additionally, both states have signed the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects
of Refugee Problems in Africa. In 2008 Gambia also created The Gambia Commission for
Refugees, which is a national legislative body to address policies surrounding refugees. In
regards to Casamance refugees becoming integrated within the communities of Gambia, the
refugees share ethnic, cultural, and linguistic attributes with local populations. From the 16th to
2
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19th century Gambia and the Casamance region were part of the Kingdom of Gabou. As a result,
they share Jola ethnic ties, cultural similarities, and linguistic traits. These commonalities make
for relatively smooth transitions into the host location.
Similarly to Gambia, Senegal also has relatively generous refugee policies in relation to
other states in the world. As noted, Senegal has signed a number of treaties and conventions
pertaining to the rights of refugees. In addition, Senegal has two entities designed specifically for
addressing policies surrounding refugees. These institutions are called, Conseil Nationale de
l’Eligiblité (CNE or The National Status Determination Council) and Comité National Chargés
de la Gestion de la Situation des Réfugiés, Rapatriés et Personnes Déplacées (CNRRPD or The
National Committee on Refugees, Returnees and Displaced People). In regards to long-term
protracted refugees in Senegal, Senegal has implemented programs to support their livelihoods
and take measures to ensure self-reliance. Under these circumstances, this study will investigate
Gambian and Senegalese refugee policies, and why these policies were enacted.
By analyzing Gambia and Senegal’s current refugee policies and examining the impacts
these policies have on Gambia, Senegal, and the Casamance refugees, this study will deepen
understanding of the refugee regime. Furthermore, this study will assess how the Casamance
refugee situation has influenced inter-state dynamics between the Gambia and Senegal. This
question will lead to greater understanding on how intrastate conflict, refugees and other
displaced people influences regional stability and dynamics.

Case Study
Many factors have contributed to the Casamance conflict. The main causes are based on
the exploitation of the southern region’s resources by the capital Dakar, and the North. The
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Casamance region is far richer in resources, including, arable land, oil and gas, than other parts
of the country; therefore, the people of this region feel that Dakar uses these resources without
corresponding financial, and material infrastructure development.6 This problem became
escalated by the geographic separation as seen in Figure 1, and the socio-economic grievances
fall along ethnic lines. In the Northern part of Senegal the majority of people are ethnically
Wolof, whereas in Casamance the majority of people are ethnically Jola. Thus, due to physical
distance and a lack of ethnic and social cohesion, the Casamance people do not identify as being
Senegalese but rather as Casamancais.7 These long-term tensions came to a head on December
26th, 1982 when the MFDC organized a peaceful protest at the regional capital of Ziguinchor.8
This protest was met with violence and suppression by the Senegalese armed forces. Prior to this
event the MFDC was a nonviolent organization that advocated against the exploitation of the
Casamance region, and advocated for the independence of the region. However, due to the
violence and numerous arrests of members, the MFDC created a military branch of the
movement known as Atika, whose members are referred to as “maquis”.9 In memory of this
demonstration one year later on December 18th 1983, the MFDC organized the same protest in
Ziguinchor. In response the Senegalese forces killed between 50 to 200 protestors; however, only
24 official deaths were reported.10 Throughout the 1980s, politically motivated arrests were
frequent, and a number of detainees were tortured or murdered in custody.11 These actions
resulted in the insurgency becoming increasingly militarized. In 1990 MFDC forces became
fully mobilized by training and arming its members in the forests and across the border in
6
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Guinea-Bissau. The first cross border attack by the MFDC occurred on the customs station at the
Gambian border in April 1990. Shortly after, in May 1990, the Senegalese government appointed
a military governor of Ziguinchor and deployed large-scale forces to the region. This series of
events ignited a further spiral of violence and human rights abuses on both sides,12 which in turn
increased the number of refugees fleeing from this conflict.
This increased level of violence made both the Senegalese government and the MFDC
eager to promote peace negotiations. However, peace negotiations have encountered multiple
obstacles, a particular one being the various factions within the MFDC. In May 1991 preliminary
ceasefire negotiations were held in Guinea-Bissau. The result of the negotiations was the MFDC
splitting into a Northern and Southern front, geographically separated by the Casamance River.
The split was based on differing interests of the ceasefire outcomes. Sidy Badji, representing the
MFDC, and the Senegalese government, signed a ceasefire agreement known as the Cacheu
accords. However, others within the MFDC, led by, Abbé Diamacoune, denounced the
agreement due to the failure of negotiations to address the MFDC’s central demand for
Casamance independence.13 Thereafter, the Northern front, led by Badji, ceased fighting
Senegalese forces in accordance with the agreement. Diamacoune and maqui commander
Léopold Sagna led the Southern front, which continued to be an active military force of MFDC.
Both the Northern and Southern fronts have experienced further splintering, although the
Northern and Southern fronts still remain the main groups. The main bases of the Southern front
were located on both sides of the Guinea-Bissau border, prior to the offensive movement by the
Senegalese government. Nonetheless, this resulted in the Southern front having close ties with
the Guinea-Bissau freedom movement in 1998. Specifically, General Ansumane Mané was
12
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suspended from his position as Guinea-Bissau’s Chief of Defense Staff, due to his ties with the
Southern front of the MFDC. This prompted Mané to take up arms against the Guinea-Bissau
government with the support of the Southern front of the MFDC.14 The civil war in GuineaBissau from June 1998 to May 1999 was in part a proxy war for the Casamance conflict.15 The
Southern front’s forces supported both coups by Mané, which took place in 1998 and in 2000,
while the Senegalese government supported Guinea-Bissau’s government. After Mané’s death in
December 2000,16 President Kumba Yala came to power in Guinea-Bissau, Yala aligned with the
Senegalese government against the Southern front. In an attempt to control the Southern front,
both Guinea-Bissau and Senegal took offensive actions. President Kumba Yala in Guinea-Bissau
forced the removal of MFDC bases on the border, and also removed the passage way created by
Mané known as São Domingos, which allowed MFDC fighters and refugees to freely move to
and from Senegal and Guinea-Bissau.17 The Senegalese government took action at the same time
by establishing military bases in the Casamance region. This renewed offensive move by the
Senegalese government threatened the Northern front as well and the ceasefire agreement with
the Northern front ended. The intermittent fighting and rising tensions in the 1990s to the early
2000s resulted in numerous civilian casualties and the displacement of 20,000 people along the
Senegal-Guinea-Bissau border.18
On December 30th 2004 the MFDC and the Senegalese government signed a truce that
lasted until August 2006. These negotiations took place in Gambia. At this point the MFDC was
overall weaker; however, general peace negotiations and solutions were still difficult to attain,
14
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due to the numerous factions and splintering within each faction. The Senegalese government
has had difficulty coordinating and communicating with each individual faction, resulting in
different factions having different ideas on how to proceed following negotiations. These
factions also make it difficult for the Senegalese government to distinguish those, which are
taking action against the government, and those, which are refraining from the use of violence.
Thus, any further attacks after the death of Mané are generalized to the MFDC as a whole, rather
than specifying particular factions. With continuous fighting many have been forced to flee to
the Gambia. Heavy fighting resumed in 2010 when MFDC fighters led attacks on Bignona, a
town just south of the Gambian border. The Senegalese forces believed that the weaponry being
used by the MFDC included Iranian arms being smuggled with the assistance of the neighboring
countries Nigeria and Gambia to support MFDC fighters. The attack on Bignona ended with
several dead and wounded on both the Senegalese forces side and the MFDC side. In the
following years intermittent fighting continued, resulting in similar outcomes. In 2014 there was
another ceasefire between Senegalese forces and the MFDC. However, during the following
years there were suspicions of President Yahya Jammeh in the Gambia recruiting MFDC fighters
into the Gambian army. In 2017 there was an ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African
States) military intervention in the Gambia. This was prompted by a disputed presidential
election and the illegitimacy of President Jammeh.19 MFDC leaders supported Jammeh and his
forces.20 In 2018 attacks against the Senegalese government continued, however leaders of the
MFDC have denied responsibility. Since 2018 there has been a general lull in fighting with only
occasional disruptions. On January 26th, 2021 the Senegalese army with the assistance of
Guinea-Bissau launched an attack on the MFDC bases in the southern region of Casamance. The
19
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goal of this was to achieve definitive peace in the region by stopping civilian causalities and
destroying illegal activity that was funding the MFDC, in an attempt to stabilize the area where
refugees can feel safe to return.21 This recent development is likely to lead to two possible
outcomes: lasting peace in the region or the continuation of the 40 yearlong conflict.

Senegal-Gambia Relations
In 2018 there were an estimated 8,029 Casamance refugees in Gambia.22 Due to the
number of Casamance refugees’ in Gambia and Gambia’s geographic location in relation to
Casamance, Gambia is a major actor in the conflict and thus, in solving the refugee situation.
Different eras in Senegal-Gambia relations have been dependent on national and regional
interests. Throughout the 1980s there were efforts to create a Senegambia confederation. This
would have been a federation of the two states, which would promote closer integration between
the two countries.23 However due to differing ideas on the division of power the confederation
never came to be.24 The Senegambia confederation would have benefitted the MFDC due to
having more representation in government since many in Gambia are also ethnically Jola;
however, the union ultimately failed.25 In an attempt to continue mutually beneficial cooperation
between the two independent states, each signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in
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January 1991.26 This treaty signified a special relationship between the two states and established
a joint commission to handle matters of common concern.27 Despite this treaty many Gambians
were frustrated at the frequent border closures, and harassment of Gambian travellers by
Senegal. Gambia’s economic survival is dependent on trade through this border, and frequent
border closures made economic success difficult to attain. Senegal argued that these policies
were necessary as anti-smuggling measures; however, many Gambians believe that Senegal was
attempting to disrupt Gambia’s economic prosperity in order to have more regional power, since
trade through Senegal is crucial to Gambia’s economic survival.28 These tensions increased in
1994 when Yahya Jammeh came to power by military coup. Originally President Jammeh
attempted to establish good relations with President Abdou Diouf of Senegal. However, Senegal
introduced tighter border control and restrictions due to suspicions that Jammeh sympathized
with the MFDC. There was some truth to this, as many Gambians supported the MFDC
separatist movement and Jammeh shared Jola ethnic ties with the MFDC. This support in
Gambia for the MFDC forced Senegal to be diplomatic to Gambia in order to not lose complete
control of the Gambian border in regards to the conflict in Casamance.29 Similarly to Senegal
accusing Jammeh of sympathizing with the MFDC, Jammeh often accused Senegal of harboring
his “enemies” as well.30While Jammeh was in power, from 1994 to 2017 Senegal-Gambia
relations were highly volatile mainly because of the security of the Casamance border. These
tensions made it difficult for both Casamance and Gambian refugees, who were both, fleeing
26
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political uncertainty, with Gambians fleeing Jammeh’s rule and Senegalese fleeing conflict, to
travel across the border. Trade was also significantly impacted on both sides. Matters were often
addressed by a “war of words”31 between Jammeh and Senegalese leaders. In 2016 Gambia was
approaching a presidential election, which presented Senegal with the opportunity to implement
a multilateral diplomacy strategy. Senegal mobilized regional and international support from the
African Union in order to remove Jammeh from office after elections. After Jammeh was
removed from office in 2017, Senegal-Gambia relations began to mend again and a series of
cooperation and agreements were signed between the two states. While there are active efforts to
cooperate between the two states, decades of tensions and a lack of general domestic peace in
both states has resulted in the regional displacement of people from both Gambia and Senegal. In
2017, the UNHCR reported that approximately 45,000 people fled Gambia between January 19th
and January 20th of 2017, due to Jammeh claiming office without authorization from the
elections, and the proceeding military intervention by the African Union.32 At this time, many of
the people fleeing from Gambia sought temporary asylum in Senegal in hopes that Jammeh
would step down. However, included many refugees from Gambia prior to Jammeh
illegitimately claiming office as well, who were seeking permanent refugee status in Senegal.
These were often journalists who were being persecuted by Jammeh. Some refugees had to wait
over two years to receive approval, and many others had their request denied.33 Senegal’s
reluctance to grant asylum to these Gambians was due to political controversies of how Gambia,
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more specifically Jammeh, would react to Senegal accepting Gambian refugees.34 This resulted
in many asylum seekers living in rural towns and villages without declaring themselves to
Senegalese authorities.35 At this time, according to the UNHCR Senegalese refugees living in
Gambia became increasingly anxious due to these events since it seemed that there was no safety
on either side of the border.36 Refugees and internally displaced peoples in both Gambia and
Senegal depict the overall regional displacement. Thus, between refugees and internally
displaced peoples in both Gambia and Senegal there is an issue of overall regional displacement.
In order to understand the impacts of this regional displacement, it is important to understand the
displacement regime’s role and responsibilities in regards to displaced people.

The Displacement Regime
This study involves two different regimes in regards to displacement: the refugee regime
and the Internally Displaced Persons regime. According to the Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees, which is the main treaty relating to how states should treat refugees, a refugee is
defined as any person who: “Owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
the protection of that country.”37 Along with the definition of a refugee, the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol encompass the rights and obligations of refugees in their country of
asylum, and states’ obligations, including cooperating with the UNHCR, to facilitate its duty of
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supervising the application of the Convention and Protocols.38 As noted, Senegal and Gambia
have also signed an additional treaty regarding refugees, the Regional Organization of African
Unity (OAU) 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.39
This Convention incorporates a regional refugee definition that includes, “Any person compelled
to leave his or her country owing to external aggression, occupation foreign domination or events
seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his or her country of origin.”40 The
OAU Convention also states “the grant of asylum to refugees is a peaceful and humanitarian act
that is not to be considered as an unfriendly act by any Member state of the OAU.”41 Senegal and
Gambia have also signed numerous treaties regarding migration on a regional level through the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Specifically, both states signed the
ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration in 2008. There are six principles detailed in order to
pursue a common approach to the management of intraregional migration: free movement of
persons within the ECOWAS zone; legal migration to other regions of the world contributes to
ECOWAS Member States’ development; combating human trafficking is a moral and
humanitarian imperative; harmonizing policies; protection of the rights of migrants; asylum
seekers and refugees; and recognizing the gender dimension of migration.42 These treaties are
examples of laws and regulations that are part of the displacement regime. The displacement
regime was designed to offer international protection to refugees, migrants, and IDPs who cannot
rely on the protection of their own state. Therefore, the displacement regime encompasses the
laws and regulations regarding the protection of displaced people with the primary principle of
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international cooperation.43 The displacement regime was created by states and international
organizations to safeguard against limitations of the state system, to ensure that even when
someone’s own state was unwilling or unable to provide its citizens basic rights, there would be
an alternative provider of these rights.44
The UNHCR envisions three durable solutions to refugee situations: voluntary
repatriation45, local integration, and resettlement46. All three solutions are meant to work
together; however, the main solution regarding this case study is local integration.47 Local
integration occurs when a refugee ends their exile by becoming a full member of their host
community in their first country of asylum.48 The UNHCR describes this as often being a
complex process due to the demands it puts on both the refugee and the receiving society.
However, the UNHCR also explains that it has benefits, such as allowing refugees to contribute
both socially and economically to the host country.49 This solution is also described as the
alternative for those who are unable to return home through voluntary repatriation.50 The
programs used to promote local integration assist long-term refugees in pursuing livelihoods.
The term “livelihood” refers to the means used to maintain and sustain life; where “means”
connotes resources, including household assets, capital, social institutions, and the strategies
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available to people through their local and transnational communities.51 When a refugee arrives
in the host country his or her immediate livelihood goals usually include physical safety from
violence, the threat of violence, or intimidation; reducing economic vulnerability and food
insecurity; finding a place to settle; and locating lost family members.52 If these goals are
achieved, but refugees remain in a protracted situation new goals will emerge as these refugees
are exposed to new experiences, and cultures. In rural areas, land is the basis of livelihoods and
the most valuable economic resource lost when rural people are forcibly displaced. This is
because prior to refugees fleeing their country of origin, agriculture was the basis of rural
people’s subsistence and income. Refugees also rely on access to common natural resources such
as, water, forests, and rangeland. Strategies for mobilizing these resources are constrained by
relations with the host community, the security situation, and government policies, which may
restrict refugees’ ability to settle and move.53 This demonstrates refugees’ reliance on their
relations with their host community and local authorities. Livelihood resources from
international humanitarian assistance organizations can assist in some of these aspects.
International support programs often come in two forms: one is formal livelihood support
programs, such as income-generating activities that are directly implemented by aid agencies in
host communities; second is through indirect economic stimuli to the host community. The latter
is usually seen as relief agencies creating new economic opportunities from both the local
community and refugees, such as construction work, translation jobs, or administrative work.54
This form of aid can create broader regional economies that assist refugees, local populations,
and surrounding areas. The former, income-generating programs, are helpful in promoting self51
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sufficiency among refugees. However, due to the permanent connotation livelihood programs
carry, host governments often politically oppose them. These programs use two approaches.
Most commonly, they are grand-based, which provides cash, capital equipment, and raw
materials to refugees for free. The other approach is based on microfinance, which offers a loan
or line of credit to start small businesses. These programs can have positive effects on the host
community by expanding the capacity and productivity of the host community economy as a
result of refugees’ labor and skills coupled with training and inputs from international
assistance.55 Providing aid to support refugee livelihoods, especially in protracted situations, can
lighten some of the unintended negative consequences that occur when hosting refugees. The
negative consequences can be seen in the form of environmental and security implications; such
as, deforestation for farming or natural resources by refugees, water pollution and uncontrolled
fishing, and illegal activities for economic gain due to a lack of opportunity.56 Thus, by
supporting refugees’ local integration processes and their pursuit of livelihood it can diminish
negative implications on the host community. However, it should be noted that none of the
UNHCR solutions are possible without international cooperation. Within the refugee regime
there has been increased tensions regarding the principle of responsibility. The tensions stem
from donor countries arguing that solutions should be found as close as possible to a refugee’s
country of origin, while host countries argue that they bear a disproportionate share of the
responsibility due to 80% of the world’s refugees originating in the global south.57 In this
instance, donor countries refer to the states that finance the aid supplied to displaced people.
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Many people in Gambia and Senegal are internally displaced persons as well. On a
regional level, Senegal and Gambia are both member states of the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS). ECOWAS members have outlined specific obligations on the
guiding principles on internal displacement through the Accra Declaration in 2000.58 These
principles include a commitment to promote initiatives to actively avoid displacement, to provide
the resources to maintain education services for children (including internally displaced children)
in conflict and post-conflict situations, and to support the reintegration of IDPs. In addition to the
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement put forth by the UNHCR that is comprised of 30
principles pertaining to practical guidelines for governments, intergovernmental organizations,
and non-governmental organizations for the protection of displaced people; and the Accra
Declaration, Senegal and Gambia are also members of the African Union (AU) who put forth the
African Union Convention for the Protection of and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons
in Africa. This is known as the Kampala Convention. This instrument legally binds governments
that signed to protect the rights and well being of people forced to flee their homes by conflict,
violence, disasters and human rights abuses and those who are internally displaced.59 It is
important to recognize that Senegal and Gambia have signed these treaties, which obligates each
state to abide by the principles indicated. Aside from multiple treaties, Senegal and Gambia, as
sovereign states, each have their own set of laws and refugee policies, discussed in the following
section. On an international level, the UNHCR designed a mechanism to ensure a more
predictable and better-coordinated response to the needs of IDPs in 2006 called the ‘Cluster
Approach’. This approach was developed in order to address IDP situations in terms of
international concerns rather than solely internal affairs. IDPs often face similar challenges to
58
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refugees, such as the need for shelter, food, and protection. However, since they have not crossed
an international border the principle responsibility for these protections rests with the
government, even if the government is responsible for their displacement. In the post-Cold War
era, international human rights and humanitarian law became more involved in discussions about
a state’s duty to protect its population. The first Representative of the UN Secretary-General for
Internally Displaced Persons, Francis Deng, coined the term ‘sovereignty as a responsibility’,
which paved the way for the international community to recognize that the right to sovereignty
comes with a national responsibility to protect the people within its borders.60 The UNHCR
outlines three dimensions of solidarity that are required in order to execute a comprehensive
response to solving the plight of refugees: between the host community and the displaced
themselves, solidarity of governments with their displaced citizens, and solidarity of the
international community with IDPs in need of assistance and protection. Solidarity between the
host community and IDPs is especially important to the safety and well being of the displaced.
Communal affiliation within host communities allow for IDPs to have more protection, and a
better sense of belonging after leaving behind their own communities. The governments of IDPs
have the duty and responsibility to protect these persons in order to uphold their sovereignty.
This is the idea of solidarity between governments an IDPs. However, some governments limit
access for international humanitarian actors to assist displaced peoples. Some governments may
also be simply, unwilling to act, especially in situations where the authorities are the perpetrators
of the displacement. In this case, governments may deny the existence of IDPs or turn a blind
eye to their plight.61 In cases where there is a lack of solidarity between the government and
IDPs, there is a need for international solidarity. International solidarity is also called for when a
60
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government is willing but not fully able to assume their responsibilities to care for IDPs. Where
national authorities are unwilling to act on their responsibilities to protect, the international
community may have an obligation to step in.
The international community sometimes overlooks the important principles covering the
protection of displaced persons when there is a long-term protracted refugee situation. A
protracted refugee situation is one in which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and
intractable state of limbo. These situations often stem from political impasses. The UNHCR
illustrates how these situations come to be by explaining “They are not inevitable, but are rather
the result of political action and inaction, both in the country of origin (the persecution or
violence that led to flight) and in the country of asylum.”62 Refugees endure these situations
because of ongoing problems in the countries of origin, and become protracted as a result of the
host country’s responses to increasing numbers of refugees. When refugees become protracted
they end up in what is called a Protracted refugee situation. A protracted refugee situation is
defined by the UNHCR as, “Situations where refugees have been in exile for 5 years or more
after their initial displacement, without immediate prospects for implementation of durable
solutions.”63 Protracted refugee situations become exacerbated when refugees have limitations
on movement and employment, which is a common theme in encampment. Encampment refer to
refugee camps, which is defined by the UNHCR as “Temporary facilities built to provide
immediate protection and assistance to people forced to flee.”64 Encampment can have negative
implications for security, and refugee livelihoods. These negative implications will be further
discussed in the analysis section, as a possible explanation for why Gambia removed its refugee
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camps in 2006 and why Senegal never implemented them at all despite a spike in refugee
numbers in 1991.
The negative consequences associated with hosting refugees often deter states from being
generous, especially for long periods of time. However, this hesitation is not evident in Senegal
or Gambia’s refugee policies. Rather the refugee policies adopted by Senegal and Gambia are
generous in relation to other states in the international community. Each state’s policies outline a
relative acceptance of refugees as well as detailed strategies towards local integration. Therefore,
this study addresses why Senegal and Gambia provide more generous frameworks for refugees
and internally displaced people than other states. The main reason that will be analyzed is the
idea of contagion and connectedness. States in the global south, such as Gambia and Senegal, are
particularly vulnerable to external shocks due to the inability of these states to protect themselves
effectively from the contagion of conflict.65 Therefore, Gambia and Senegal’s policies, which
will be discussed in the following section, illustrate the successful implementation of local
integration as a means to prevent contagion.

Gambia and Senegal’s Refugee Policies
In the initial years of the conflict in Casamance, Gambia was receiving many refugees
fleeing from civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone; however, most refugees in Gambia were
from the Casamance region.66 Due to the high number of refugees, Gambia had five refugee
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camps at Kwinella, Bambali, Sifoe, Kitti, and Basse as pictured in Figure 2.67

Figure 2

The number of refugees in Gambia began to decrease around 2005, and the camps were
closed. However, after the closure of camps there was a renewed influx of Casamance refugees
in Gambia in 2006. The UNHCR considered reopening the camps at Sifoe and Kitti but the
Gambian government was opposed to this due to the camps placement near the borders. The
Gambian government worried that the placement of these two camps would attract armed
fighters. Therefore, the UNHCR and the Gambian government agreed to reopen refugee camp,
Bambali, for Casamance refugees. However, refugees refused to be placed at Bambali on the
basis that it was far from the Casamance border. The Casamance refugees wanted to be closer to
the border in the event that they would have the opportunity to recover their animals, materials,
and continue to have contact with their families that remained in Casamance.68 Thus, in 2006 a
large number of Casamance refugees settled in Gambia and were issued with refugee identity
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cards for the first time.69 It is important to note that the refugees settling in Gambia prior to 2006
often went back and forth between Senegal and Gambia; however, the refugees settling in
Gambia after 2006 were settling at more permanent rates.70 Since the closure of the camps
Gambia has implemented more reforms to strengthen its legal framework and policies on
refugees. In 2008 Gambia established the Gambia Commission for Refugees through its Refugee
Act of 2008. This created a branch of legislation that is tasked with coordinating all refugee
affairs in Gambia. Furthermore, a representative from the UNHCR sits on the commission’s
advisory board.71 In addition to granting refugee identity cards the Refugee Act of 2008 grants
refugees the access to work, education and health services.72 In regards to permanence, which
many Casamance refugees were seeking after 2006; refugees in Gambia have the right to become
naturalized Gambian citizens after they have legally resided in the country for a period of 15
years. In addition, as of 2018, Gambia agreed to include the years spent as a refugee towards the
total time required to meet the criteria for naturalization. In addition, residency permits for
immigrants in Gambia are valid for one year; however, for refugees the permit is valid for 5
years.73
These are important policies that help establish a legal framework for refugees in
Gambia. Many Casamance refugees choose to settle in rural villages close to the CasamanceGambian border, and as of 2011 records estimate that approximately 83 villages in Gambia host
or have previously hosted Casamance refugees.74 These communities are reasonably well
organized, with each village having a refugee leader. The Gambia Food and Nutrition
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Association (GAFNA) organizes villages hosting refugees into clusters and the refugee leader is
in frequent contact with GAFNA field officers in the area. In addition, the refugee identity cards
noted above also entitle refugee children school fees of up to 5000 dalasi (US $180). However,
these refugee identity cards are applied for in Banjul at the Gambian Immigration Department,
which is far from the Casamance border and many host villages. The Gambian Immigration
Department recognized this challenge and implemented an annual refugee registration program
in rural areas where refugee cards may be applied for in specified villages on particular days.
This gave the majority of Casamance refugees better access to refugee identity cards.
Furthermore, in 2006 the UNHCR appealed to the World Food Program (WFP) for assistance to
Gambia due to the Casamance refugee situation. The WFP supplied a limited distribution of food
from 2006 through 2009.75 In 2007, the WFP increased the amount of food distribution due to
the poverty levels seen in the host villages of Gambia. The World Bank identified that 60% of
Gambians fall below the poverty line.76 This is important to note because often in cases where
the host community is impoverished there are underlying tensions on the basis that refugees are
receiving assistance and the host community is not.77 However, this was not seen in Gambia.
Rather, the WFP increased food supply since refugees and their hosts were sharing the supply of
food that was being distributed, and the food that was being farmed by the local population.78 In
addition to food supply, the UNHCR, partnering with the Gambia Red Cross (GRC) and
GAFNA supplied items such as latrines, water, sleeping mats, mosquito nets and basic clothing
items. Once official supply distributions ended in 2009, there was another emergency supply by
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) through the GRC in 2011 due to another
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influx of refugees. However, for the most part the assistance switched to a sustainable livelihood
program. These programs focused on restoring farming practices through the distribution of
seeds, tools, and animals. This program also provided community gardens and soap-making
training. These programs have been instrumental in assisting refugees as well as preventing
further vulnerability in the host community. With this being said, these programs have run into
obstacles and limitations due to the budgets and financial capacities of Gambia’s institutions and
the UNHCR. This is a common problem facing host countries of protracted refugee situations. In
terms of the second solution involved in this study, voluntary repatriation, the Casamance region
remains unstable according to the UNHCR as of January 2021, thus this is not applicable in
terms of Gambia’s current policies.79 Nonetheless, especially given the financial circumstances,
Gambia’s policies towards the Casamance refugees have proved to benefit the refugees and the
host villages in which they reside.
Senegal has signed the above regional and international treaties regarding internally
displaced people and refugees. The two main institutions working on forced migration in Senegal
are: Conseil Nationale de l’Eligiblité (CNE or The National Status Determination Council) and
Comité National Chargés de la Gestion de la Situation des Réfugiés, Rapatriés et Personnes
Déplacées (CNRRPD or The National Committee on Refugees, Returnees and Displaced
People).80 The CNE is responsible for advising the president on the status of a given refugee.
This Council is presided over by the president of the Supreme Court and its members include
representatives from the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition,
the UNHCR holds an observer role on this Council. The CNRRPD is based at the presidency and
led by a representative of the Senegalese armed forces; however, the president’s personal chief
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of staff runs the Committee. This Committee deals with questions pertaining to returnees,
refugees, and internally displaced populations. The CNRRPD is also responsible for refugees
once an asylum claim has been issued. While these are the current frameworks of refugee policy
In Senegal, the UNHCR has been urging Senegal to reform the asylum process and the refugee
system. The two main reasons that reform is needed are the low level of cooperation and
communication between the CNE and the CNRRPD, and the strong presidential control over the
individual refugee status determination process.81 With this being said, when Gambians were
fleeing to Senegal at high rates82 in 2017, Senegal worked with the UNHCR to assist rapidly. A
UNHCR report stated that, “UNHCR, other aid agencies and the Senegalese authorizes have
been monitoring the borders since the political crisis erupted, deploying joint field missions last
week and this week to southern Senegal’s Casamance, bordering Gambia, and its
surroundings.”83 In this crisis situation Senegal was able to act quickly with the assistance of the
UNHCR, ECOWAS, and the African Union. This regional, and international approach used
military intervention, which resulted in Jammeh stepping down from office84 and many
Gambians being able to return home. The Gambians fleeing political uncertainty from Jammeh’s
reign were able to return home; however, there is still a large displaced population of displaced
persons in both Senegal and Gambia.
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While this study focuses on Gambia and Senegal it is important to note that there are
many refugees from other parts of the continent in Senegal.85 Senegal received a particularly
large number of refugees in 1991. Many of these refugees remain in Senegal today. Therefore,
the livelihood programs explained are in reference to many refugees that arrived at this time.
Approval for permanent residency is difficult and often takes many years due to the low level of
cooperation and communication between the CNE and the CNRRPD. However, economically, in
terms of local integration, refugees in Senegal are able to easily practice farming, and many
women have made businesses selling artwork.86 There has also been accessible healthcare to
refugees. The element of livelihood that is lacking in Senegal’s framework is the availability of
education. Approximately 73% of 400 household heads could not read or write and 56% of
refugee children under 20 are not in school.87 Senegal has taken strategy initiatives in partnership
with the UNHCR and L’office Africain pour le développement et la coopération (OFADEC) to
improve this element, and strengthen the other elements of livelihood. The strategy involves
awareness campaigns with health centers and schools in order to popularize the use of existing
channels and also work with court officials to help refugee children obtain civil status. The
campaigns also help provide necessary financial and infrastructural assistance to the refugees
living in Senegal.88 Therefore, Senegal provides a legal framework for refugees that promote
livelihoods and integration.
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In Gambia there were an estimated number of 4,000 internally displaced people as of
201989, in addition to the Casamance refugees in the country, which is approximately 8,000 as of
2018.90 In Senegal as of 2018, there were approximately 18,000 internally displaced people and
15,000 refugees as of 2021.91 With this being said, the policies of each state to promote refugee
livelihoods and local integration demonstrate its success.

Analysis
The migration of refugees is a form of direct contagion. Contagion can be defined as a
process whereby internal conflict in one location alters the probability of another internal conflict
erupting in another location.92 There are other forms of direct contagion such as arms trafficking
that can relate to the direct spillover of conflict across borders as well. There are two main
reasons why refugees can cause a contagion effect: one is because it can exacerbate competition
over scarce resources in the host country, and two is because of possible militarization of refugee
camps.93 The fear of direct contagion can, in part, explain why Gambia and Senegal provide
generous opportunities to pursue livelihoods. By Senegal and Gambia assisting refugees in the
pursuit of livelihood there is less likely to be animosity between the local populations and
refugees over scarce resources. With this being said, contagion is may not be the sole reason for
implementing livelihood programs. In hosting states with large refugee settlements, some
governing parties fear a loss of power due to popular anger over economic hardships and social
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pressures sparked by scarce resources.94 Furthermore, the fear of direct contagion through the
militarization of camps might also explain the removal of refugee camps by Gambia after 2006,
and the reason why Senegal never established camps even though it had a dramatic increase in
the refugee population in 1991.The fear of direct contagion due to camps is also explained in
refugee literature. The sequence of refugee encampment contributing to cross-border disputes
and regional destabilization is explained as the following: refugee camps function as bases for
rebels to attack across the border; refugee-sending states view refugees as an indictment of the
government’s legitimacy and as a potential military threat; the sending state may pursue refugees
across the border, thus subjecting them to military attack; lastly, as these cross-border attacks
escalate, the risk of international war grows and the more states drawn in increases the likelihood
of regional destabilization.95 This demonstrates a possible reasonable cause for Gambia and
Senegal to not implement camps on the basis that it decreases the likelihood of regional
destabilization and international conflict between the two states. The other direct form of
contagion is arms trafficking. When an intrastate conflict is occurring there is often an increased
availability of arms. Thus, when there is not heavy border control, these arms may be transferred
to neighboring states where aggrieved groups may be willing to initiate violent conflict once they
have the means of doing so.96 A third form of direct contagion is that civil war in one country
may often affect the economy of surrounding states. Since civil wars lead to a reduction in trade
and investment in proximate countries, which in turn heightens the probability of conflict.97.
Lastly, the fear of direct contagion through arms trafficking may explain why Senegal is often
quick to act on border protection and closures, as seen during Jammeh’s reign in Gambia.
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In addition to direct forms of contagion there are also indirect forms of contagion.
Indirect contagion is the intangible process whereby conflict in one country provides lessons,
inspiration, and clues for actors in other countries, also known as strategic learning.98 This can be
seen where a conflict in one state may inspire a group in another state to increase its demands
and attempt to use violent means to achieve their demands. This form of indirect contagion
involves refugees as well, since refugees can be a means for rebels to expand their social
networks.99 Another indirect form of contagion can be seen in the nature of the conflict. For
example, separatist conflicts are more likely to lead to contagion compared to wars fought over
government power.100 This is due to separatist conflicts typically involving regional ethnic
groups that have ties to kin across borders, who are more likely to act on demonstration effects.
In other words, the involvement in conflict by a group in one state increases the likelihood of
conflict erupting in a nearby state that shares the same group. Indirect contagion was seen in this
case study between the MFDC and the Guinea-Bissau freedom movement. General Mané in
Guinea-Bissau was working with the MFDC and acquiring lessons and inspiration to conduct
two coups. As mentioned, the freedom fighters with Mané lost, however, this illustrates how this
conflict has already exposed the region to contagion.
While these are all forms of contagion, it is important to note that different states have
different levels of susceptibility to contagion. First, a state’s susceptibility to contagion is
conditioned on state capacity. In states with high capacity that have stability, control, resources,
and the ability to adapt and respond to unexpected crises, contagion is less likely to occur even if
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there is a nearby intrastate conflict.101 The Fragile States Index has a scale of state capacity
ranging from sustainable, stable, warning and alert. According to the Fragile States Index,
Senegal and Gambia are in the “warning” category, and Guinea-Bissau is in the “alert”
category.102 From this analysis it draws a better understanding of why Guinea-Bissau
experienced high levels of contagion. Second, authoritarian regimes are increasingly receptive to
contagion. The probability of contagion heightens even more in states that are ethnically
polarized with authoritative regimes.103 Due to this increased susceptibility in authoritative
regimes, it more clearly illustrates why in Gambia under Jammeh had a generous approach
towards the Casamance refugees in Gambia. This becomes especially important when noting that
many Gambians shared ethnic ties with the Casamance refugees. Therefore, Jammeh was most
likely aware that maltreatment towards these refugees could lead to a spillover of conflict from
Casamance in Gambia. This becomes even more apparent due to the last factor of susceptibility,
which is, states that are in close proximity to the state involved in intrastate conflict are more
exposed to spillover of externalities and demonstration effects.104 This may increase vulnerability
to contagion.
This idea of contagion in regards to proximity brings up another transnational dimension
of intrastate conflict called connectedness. This is the idea that conflicts can internationalize
more broadly and involve a larger set of countries, issues, and actors. Over time, actors from
different conflicts may start to cooperate with each other due to similar goals, a common enemy,
and/or share ethnic bonds or ideological affiliation.105 Some forms of connectedness can lead to a
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regional conflict complex. In these cases conflicts are mutually reinforcing to the extent that it
may be infeasible to solve just one without considering the regional aspects. The interlink of
conflicts create much more complex issues. This is because there is a larger set of actors that
have stake in the outcome, and arms and resources are likely to become more available leading
to more violence.106 This was seen between the Guinea-Bissau freedom movement and the
Casamance conflict. This can have an overall negative impact on regional stability.
Therefore, with regional dynamics at stake due to the 40-year intrastate Casamance
conflict Gambia and Senegal both may have identified the importance of having generous
refugee policies to avoid factors of contagion and connectedness to exacerbate the conflict. This
demonstrates the importance of securing general regional stability. Therefore, the two states use
their refugee policies as a means to strengthen their, national securities, geographical/territorial
influence, and economic interdependence.

Conclusion
Gambia and Senegal’s refugee policies can be a reflection of their foreign policy aims to
achieve regional stability, and security through promoting livelihoods. The intrastate Casamance
conflict in Senegal has resulted in over 40,000 displaced persons107, a proxy war in GuineaBissau108, and a decrease in overall regional stability. These negative regional consequences of
this ongoing intrastate conflict have made Senegal and Gambia open to finding other means to
regain regional stability through their refugee policies. The analysis of the displacement regime
indicates that this is not a common approach, and usually host countries implement policies that
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do not promote local integration due to its permanent connotation. However, it has been found
that these policies do not only increase regional stability and reduce susceptibility to contagion,
but also improve the lives of refugees, displaced persons and host communities. This is because
Senegal and Gambia have policies that facilitate refugee livelihoods, and self-sufficiency. These
policies work especially well in this region due to the socio-cultural similarities among refugees
and host communities. National and international aid supplied to refugees is often shared with
the local populations, and local populations often share land and equipment. While this is in part
credited to the socio-cultural similarities of the populations, it should be noted that the policies
Senegal and Gambia put forth such as, promoting and raising awareness for integration, also
plays a major role in the smooth transition. Other policies by Senegal and Gambia such as,
supplying resources, with the partnership of outside organizations, is also crucial in improving
the lives of refugees, displaced persons, and for better economic practices domestically and
between states. In this way, this study contributes to knowledge of the displacement regime and
how states can foster better care for vulnerable populations, such as displaced people, while
simultaneously strengthening security, economic opportunities, and regional stability.
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